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Taking Aim at Pointing Guns?  Start with 
Citizen’s Arrest, Not Stand Your Ground: A 
Reply to Joseph Blocher, Samuel W. Buell, 
Jacob D. Charles, and Darrell A.H. Miller, 
Pointing Guns, 99 TEXAS L. REV. 1173 
(2021) 
 








In Pointing Guns,1 Joseph Blocher, Sam Buell, Jacob Charles, and Dar-
rell Miller present a disturbing challenge for criminal law and for society at 
large. People keep pointing guns at each other. These gun brandishings may 
be illegal assaults or legal acts of self-defense. It is hard ex post to determine 
the difference, and ex ante it may be difficult even for the gun owners them-
selves to discern whether their conduct is impermissible. 
 
† Earle Hepburn Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania.  I thank 
Sam Buell for discussion and Maggie Sawin for excellent research assistance. 
1. Joseph Blocher, Samuel W. Buell, Jacob D. Charles & Darrell A.H. Miller, Pointing Guns, 
99 TEXAS L. REV. 1173 (2021). 
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This paper is an excellent piece of legal scholarship on a pressing social 
phenomenon that has received neither the scholarly nor the practical attention 
that it deserves. Still, the authors’ reliance on stand your ground laws as a 
pivotal part of the problem misunderstands two aspects of the gun debate.   
First, retreat rules, and the exception created by stand your ground laws, 
are only triggered when deadly force is used. But pointing a gun may not be 
deadly force in the applicable jurisdiction. The fact that whether the gun dis-
play is deadly force often turns on the mental state of the weapon wielder 
means there is even greater ambiguity with respect to how to understand what 
a gun display means, particularly for the person at the other end of the raised 
gun. And, decision makers will face even more difficult inquiries in assessing 
the legality of the brandishing ex post. More fundamentally, however, society 
needs to ask whether we truly think that pointing a gun is no more problem-
atic than throwing a punch. 
Second, citizen’s arrest provisions exacerbate the gun-display problem.  
Stand your ground laws effectively allow citizens to act like law enforcement 
does, as law enforcement has never been required to retreat.2 But little known 
and even less understood citizen’s arrest provisions give citizens the power 
to effectuate arrests; some jurisdictions even authorize the use of deadly 
force. Given current debates aiming to curb policing, one might expect citi-
zen’s arrest to fill the lacuna and the gun-pointing problem to become even 
more significant. Indeed, the shift in cultural norms is moving from citizen 
defense to citizen offense. It is this cultural norm, and the laws that enable it, 
that cry for immediate attention. 
This Reply proceeds in three parts. First, I briefly review the authors’ 
arguments as to the legal ambiguities with respect to pointing guns, the law 
and rhetoric that may inhibit potential reform, and the proposed solutions to 
this problem. Second, I problematize the authors’ reliance on stand your 
ground laws as a primary culprit in this debate, as stand your ground laws are 
only applicable if pointing a gun is seen as deadly force. Instead, I contend 
that we have a more fundamental issue with how we view the pointing of a 
gun in the first place. Third, I argue that far from the law of defense creating 
the ambiguity, it is actually aggression—namely, aggression in the name of 




2. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Stand Your Ground, in Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan, eds., THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED ETHICS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 731, 742 
(2019) (arguing that “what SYG laws do is essentially turn citizens into law enforcement” because 
“[l]aw enforcement officers are limited by proportionality and necessity, but they are not required 
to retreat”). 
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I. The Gun-Pointing Problem 
 
The authors begin with compelling examples of how problematic gun 
displays can be, from shoppers at a Walmart in Florida who pulled a gun to 
the St. Louis couple who displayed a semiautomatic rifle and pointed a hand-
gun at demonstrators.3 Although these cases became national news, they re-
veal something broader: most gun violence does not cause injury. As the au-
thors note, “The vast majority of legally relevant gun-related activity, 
whether salutary, benign, or unwelcome, does not involve pulling a trigger.”4  
Indeed, there is an extraordinarily wide gap between the number of self-re-
ported defensive gun uses and the number of gun incidents that cause injury.5 
People may be pointing guns all over the place, and the law is not picking up 
these cases.   
The authors’ concern, however, is not that we are not empirically count-
ing these incidents; it is that we do not know whether they are crimes. A gun 
owner may believe she successfully defended herself, but the person on the 
other end of the gun may believe he was assaulted.6 Psychological studies 
give further reason to worry, as they point to the likely racialized distribu-
tional effects as well as the increase in aggression when guns are present.7 
The authors then contend that the criminal law fails to give appropriate 
guidance. To understand how the criminal law operates, the authors look to 
the law of Florida, Michigan, Missouri, and Texas, three of the four of which 
being the jurisdictions in which the events in the introduction took place. In 
the first instance, the criminal law does seem to declare pointing a gun at 
someone a crime.8 But whatever clarity offense definitions give, this resolu-
tion is soon lost once we turn to self-defense.   
With respect to self-defense, the authors gesture at the general require-
ments before identifying the culprit in each jurisdiction as stand your ground 
laws.9 Each jurisdiction allows the defender to remain where she has a right 
to be, rather than requiring her to retreat.10 The authors contrast this stand 
your ground position with the Model Penal Code’s requirement of retreat.11 
The permissiveness of self-defense in these states, both because of stand your 
ground and because self-defense only requires that actors reasonably believe 
 
3. Blocher, supra note 1, at 1173–74. 
4. Id. at 1176. 
5. Id. at 1178. 
6. Id. at 1178–79. 
7. Id. at 1179–82. 
8. Id. at 1182–85 (concluding that many gun pointings do constitute assault but noting ambigu-
ity in the statutes). 
9. Id. at 1185–88. 
10. Id. at 1186–88. 
11. Id. at 1188. 
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that force is necessary,12 combined with the requirement in each state that the 
government disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt,13 leads the au-
thors to conclude that any gun pointing, with a plausible claim of self-de-
fense, is unlikely to lead to criminal liability.14 And, enforcement bias com-
pounds the likely racialized effects.15 Criminal law offers nothing but “thin 
and blurry” answers.16  
The authors then turn to the Second Amendment. After surveying the 
case law, they conclude that even under the robust gun ownership protections 
provided by current jurisprudence, there is still room for regulating pointing 
a gun at someone.17 Still, the authors suggest that the rhetorical power of the 
Second Amendment pervades the wider gun debate.18 Generally, people as-
sociate their guns with the right to protect themselves, a right they deem en-
shrined in the Constitution.19  
What can be done? The authors are skeptical that we can reform criminal 
law statutes, though there is some hope that specifying clear rules, like the 
ones considered in the policing context, may be better than broad standards.20 
The authors suggest that private business owners can be encouraged to en-
gage in greater regulation.21 Finally, the authors suggest battle: to wage war 
directly on the content of the social norms of how gun owners may display 
their weapons.22 The authors believe there is some room for law to play a role 
in shaping those norms.23 
Although the authors discuss a troubling problem, one might identify 
the primary “villain” of their narrative as stand your ground laws. These laws 
are typically thought to be the handiwork of the National Rifle Association 
as it seeks to enshrine stronger gun rights.24 To the NRA, then, the embold-
enment of gun usage may be a feature, not a bug.  
 
12. Id.  at 1188–89. 
13. Id.  at 1188. 
14. Id. at 1190. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 1191–94. 
18. Id. at 1194–98. 
19. Id. at 1195–98. 
20. Id. at 1198. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1199. 
23. Id. at 1200. 
24. Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 UNIV. 
MIA. L. REV. 827, 836–40 (2013) (discussing the NRA’s “pivotal role” in Florida and how it used 
Florida as a “launching pad” for nationwide legislation); Renée Lettow Lerner, The Worldwide Pop-
ular Revolt Against Proportionality in Self-Defense Law, 2 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 331, 343 (2006) 
(noting Florida’s stand your ground law “is part of an established trend in the U.S., and the NRA is 
working to keep the trend rolling”). 
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My worry, however, is that this is not a story about stand your ground.  
Stand your ground is ultimately beside the point. The questions are far more 
fundamental. First, how do we conceptualize what kind of force it is to point 
a gun at another? That is, even defensively, what does it mean to display a 
gun? Second, as citizen’s arrest cases are percolating to the surface of our 
public consciousness, we need to stop worrying about the people who only 
use guns on the defense and start thinking about how the law is authorizing 
civilian gun usage to go on the offense.  
  
II. Is Pointing a Gun Deadly Force? 
 
Stand your ground is only the problem if the actors are using deadly 
force. If pointing a gun is nondeadly force, then retreat is never required.25 If 
retreat is not required, then stand your ground, which eliminates the duty to 
retreat before using deadly force,26 never comes into play.  
Three of the authors’ four states would place displaying a gun on the 
nondeadly side of the divide. In Florida, “‘the mere display of a gun, or even 
pointing a gun at another’s head or heart without firing it, is not deadly force 
as a matter of law.’”27 It is only deadly force when the natural, probable, and 
foreseeable consequences of the defendant’s actions are death, and only dis-
charging a firearm has been held to meet that standard as a matter of law.28  
Michigan concurs. “A threat of deadly force is itself nondeadly force.”29  This 
includes brandishing a weapon.30 Texas, too, treats displaying a gun as po-
tentially nondeadly force. “[A] threat to cause death or serious bodily injury 
by the production of a weapon or otherwise, as long as the actor’s purpose is 
limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, 
does not constitute the use of deadly force.”31 Only Missouri disagrees.  
Brandishing a deadly weapon is deadly force because “‘the risk of death or 
 
25. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 578 (5th ed. 2010) (“It seems everywhere agreed that 
one who can safely retreat need not do so before using nondeadly force.”). 
26. Id. (noting “the question of the duty to retreat is a problem only when deadly force is used 
in self-defense”). 
27. Copeland v. State, 277 So. 3d 1137, 1140, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Jackson 
v. State, 179 So. 3d 443, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)) (finding the defendant was entitled to a 
nondeadly force instruction when he pointed the gun at the victim ostensibly to deter the victim 
from continuing to pursue him in a road rage incident).   
28. Id. at 1140–41 (citing Cruz v. State, 971 So. 2d 178, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). 
29. People v. Ra, No. 343202, 2019 WL 3941490 at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2019) (per 
curiam).   
30. Id. at *4. 
31. TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.04. 
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serious physical harm is significantly elevated when one of the parties to an 
angry confrontation displays a handgun.’”32  
It should be apparent how extremely difficult a public policy question 
this is. Indeed, while the Model Penal Code agrees with Florida, Michigan, 
and Texas (or they agree with it), the Restatement (Third) of Torts has just 
taken the opposite position. Model Penal Code section 3.11(2) claims that a 
gun display is not deadly force—“so long as the actor’s purpose is limited to 
creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary.”33 That 
is, the law says that pointing a gun may be no different than pushing one’s 
alleged assailant. In contrast, the Restatement (Third) of Torts recently parted 
ways with the Restatement (Second), rejecting that threatening to use greater 
force would constitute nondeadly force.34 The drafters reasoned that (1) the 
rule is difficult for fact finders to apply as it is difficult to know whether the 
defender only intended to discourage the aggressor, (2) it might encourage 
this kind of nondeadly force instead of a lesser available means, and (3) au-
thorizing deadly weapons could lead to an escalation in violence.35 
This disparate treatment means that there is uncertainty at the core of 
gun usage. There is the uncertainty for the person at the other end of the barrel 
as to what the actor intends. There is uncertainty for law enforcement, pros-
ecutors, and juries ex post. But more fundamentally, we as a society do not 
know what it means to point a gun in self-defense.   
This question is both normative and empirical and likely turns on the 
“typical case” that opponents and proponents imagine. If one believes that 
the typical defensive gun use is done by the small woman who is then able to 
ward off an attacker, one will think that this option should be readily available 
to her without the limitations placed on deadly force. She is merely shooing 
them away. If one believes that the typical defensive action is actually an 
inaccurate racist assessment that a black male poses a threat, then one is far 
more likely to classify this as deadly force. Though one could simply ask how 
frequently pointing a gun ends with firing that gun, unfortunately this issue 
is not simply a matter of getting the facts right. People’s views are more 
keyed to their cultural constructs than to the data.36 And, even if we had the 
data and the error rates, the question of what a fair distribution of errors is 
 
32. State v. Endicott, 600 S.W.3d 818, 825 n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting State v. Parkhurst, 
845 S.W.2d 31, 36 (Mo. banc 1992)).   
33. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2). 
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 22 cmt. i (AM. L. 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2021). 
35. Id.  
36. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of 
Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1317 (2003) (“Once the contribution of cultural 
orientations is exposed, it becomes clear that those involved in the gun control debate aren’t really 
arguing about whose perception of risk is more grounded in empirical reality; they are arguing about 
what it would say about our shared values to credit one or the other side’s fears through law.”). 
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raises a normative question, not an empirical one.37 Ultimately, we need con-
sensus on just how serious it is to point a gun at someone.  
 
III. Citizen’s Arrest, not Stand Your Ground 
 
Even if we understand how guns are used defensively, we need to rec-
ognize that the highwater mark of gun usage is not stand your ground. Stand 
your ground laws have been subject to sustained criticism. To be fair, the jury 
is still out on some of the central critiques. Although some argue that stand 
your ground laws embolden white men to attack black men, other studies find 
no such effects.38 And, while some argue that stand your ground engrains 
masculine norms, others contend it levels the playing field for women.39 In-
deed, even the authors’ harkening back to the “true man” defense as having 
“gendered normative significance” misses the fact that “true men” were not 
manly men but blameless ones.40 Perhaps the greatest red herring is that stand 
your ground played a key role in the George Zimmerman case.41 The problem 
was not the stand your ground law, given that under Zimmerman’s account, 
he could not safely retreat.42 The problem was that the court never gave an 
initial aggressor instruction that Zimmerman’s behavior provoked the 
 
37. Cf. Renée Jorgensen Bolinger, Reasonable Mistakes and Regulative Norms: Racial Bias in 
Defensive Harm, 25 J. POL. PHIL. 196, 211 (2017) (“When the standards determining which mis-
takes are ‘reasonable’ are partially shaped by racial bias, use of a reasonable belief standard forces 
an already vulnerable minority to face increased risk of harm so that others can reduce their own 
risks. This is unjust in two distinguishable ways: (i) it imposes unfair risk of suffering serious harm 
on the minority, and (ii) it treats them as moral inferiors by refusing to acknowledge bias-driven 
harms to them as violations of their rights.”).  
38. Compare Lave, supra note 24, at 850–54 (“Florida has a particularly ugly history of extra-
judicial killings of African Americans, and Stand Your Ground continues that legacy.”), with Chan-
dler McClellan & Erdal Tekin, Stand Your Ground Laws and Homicides (IZA Discussion Paper 
No. 6705, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2114885 [https://perma.cc/UR6M-YEB4] (finding that 
stand your ground laws increase homicide among white males but finding no similar increase in the 
killing of black men).  
39. Compare Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, 
Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 UNIV. MIA. L. REV. 1099, 1127 
(2014) (arguing “Stand Your Ground re-entrenches gender norms to restrain women’s use of force 
even as men’s use of force expands”), with Alicia M. Kuhns, Why Maryland Should Stand Its 
Ground Instead of Retreat, 48 UNIV. BALT. L.F. 17, 24 (2017) (arguing duties to retreat can harm 
women). 
40. Compare Blocher, supra note 1, at 1187 n.79, with RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY 
TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 9 (1991) (tracing this 
original understanding to Sir Matthew Hale). 
41. See Cynthia V. Ward, “Stand Your Ground” and Self-Defense, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 89, 92 
(2015) (noting the misplaced blame placed on stand your ground in the aftermath of the killing of 
Trayvon Martin). 
42. See Ferzan, supra note 2, at 746 n.1; Franks, supra note 39, at 1104–05. 
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violence in a way that forfeited his defensive rights, even in a stand your 
ground jurisdiction.43 
Stand your ground also seems theoretically misunderstood at times. Alt-
hough it might be thought to abandon proportionality,44 it does not do so. 
Deadly force is only authorized against some types of threats.45 Similarly, the 
claim that stand your ground laws abandon necessity is overinclusive as 
well.46 The defender is not permitted to use deadly force if nondeadly will 
do. Rather, the only thing that stand your ground does (with respect to sub-
stantive self-defense) is to eliminate the requirement to retreat. Just as law 
enforcement does not need to retreat, neither do citizens in stand your ground 
jurisdictions. 
Elsewhere, I have argued that this transformation of citizen into cop is 
practically redundant because little-known citizen’s arrest laws already do 
just that.47 But here I want to suggest that what we see percolating to the top 
of the cultural conversation is not the language of defense—it is the language 
of aggression. Citizens’ arrests, and more generally the idea of using violence 
in the name of the state, is where the action is. And, the laws governing citi-
zen’s arrest further muddy the waters with respect to the criminal law while 
simultaneously the rhetoric of citizen’s arrest is giving far more robust sup-
port for gun usage than self-defense does. 
Let’s return to the authors’ four jurisdictions. In Florida, a private citizen 
can arrest a person who commits a felony or breach of peace in their presence, 
or if the arresting citizen has probable cause to believe, and does believe, the 
person arrested to be guilty of a felony or breach of peace.48 A “‘breach of 
the peace’” includes any action that “‘threatens the public security and in-
volves violence,’”49 including drunk driving on a sparsely populated road.50 
Michigan also authorizes citizen’s arrest for felonies:  
“A private person may make an arrest—in the following situations:  
 
43. Ferzan, supra note 2, at 746 n.1; see generally Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Provocateurs, 7 
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 597 (2013) (explaining how those who pick fights lose defensive rights). 
44. See Heidi M. Hurd, Stand Your Ground, in THE ETHICS OF SELF-DEFENSE 254, 259 (Chris-
tian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2016) (arguing in favor of such laws and against the “propor-
tionality principle”). 
45. Ferzan, supra note 2, at 742 (demonstrating that Florida law does not abandon proportion-
ality). 
46. Id. at 736 (explaining that stand your ground laws accept necessity limitations). 
47. Id. at 743 (“The bottom line is that if someone is shooting at you in Florida, you are permit-
ted to shoot him if necessary to effect an arrest, and when you are arresting, you are never required 
to retreat. Indeed, you can shoot the person in the back as he is running away if that is the only way 
to prevent his escape.”) (citation omitted). 
48. State v. Price, 74 So. 3d 528, 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Edwards v. State, 462 So. 2d 
581, 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
49. State v. Furr, 723 So. 2d 842, 845 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting City of Waukesha v. 
Gorz, 479 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)). 
50. Id. at 845. 
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(a) For a felony committed in [his] presence; (b) [i]f the person to be 
arrested has committed a felony although not in [his] presence.”51  
This includes using deadly force to prevent the escape of nondangerous 
felons.52 In Missouri, “[a] private citizen may arrest on a showing of the com-
mission of a felony and reasonable grounds to suspect the arrested party, to 
prevent an affray or breach of the peace, and for a misdemeanor if authorized 
by statute.”53 Among the behaviors that count as breaches of the peace is the 
use of “fighting words” in an angry manner, that is, calling someone a “son-
of-a-bitch.”54  In Texas:  
“(a) A peace officer or any other person, may, without a warrant, arrest 
an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view, 
if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the public 
peace.”55 
Ultimately, in Texas, a citizen can make an arrest for a felony committed 
in their view or for a misdemeanor in their presence where the “evidence 
shows that the person’s conduct poses a threat of continuing violence or harm 
to himself or the public.”56 
More generally, it is important to appreciate the full scope of these laws.  
Joshua Dressler notes that there is a broad minority rule for crime prevention 
under which private persons are permitted to use deadly force to stop the 
commission of any felony.57 He notes “an undesirable anomaly: If a defend-
ant kills an intended thief, she may avoid conviction if she claims the defense 
of crime prevention, but may be convicted of murder if she raises a defense-
of-property claim.”58  
The rules for citizen’s arrest, particularly for using deadly force, are dif-
ferent than those for police. In many jurisdictions, a felony must really have 
occurred; if not, probable cause isn’t going to cut it.59 Moreover, in many 
 
51. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.16 (West 1988). 
52. People v. Couch, 461 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Mich. 1990). The court noted, “The Legislature is 
presumed to have accepted the then-existing common-law rule that ‘[a]ny private person (and a 
fortiori a peace-officer) [may arrest a fleeing felon] . . . and if they kill him, provided he cannot oth-
erwise be taken, it is justifiable . . . ’” Id. at 686 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
53. State v. Devlin, 745 S.W.2d 850, 851–52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
54. State v. Parker, 378 S.W.2d 274, 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (“Again according to his testi-
mony, he had used the words ‘son-of-a-bitch’ in an angry manner. We are not an authority on 
whether ‘swearing’ is considered by the general public to consist only in taking the Lord’s name in 
vain. Certainly in Southern Missouri the words ‘son-of-a-bitch’ when used in an angry manner are 
considered as ‘fighting words’ and a breach of the peace likely to produce a more violent breach.”). 
55. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01 (West 2015).  
56. Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
57. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 280 (2009).   
58. Id.  
59. Thomas J. Griffin, Annotation, Private Person’s Authority, in Making Arrest for Felony, to 
Shoot or Kill Alleged Felon, 32 A.L.R.3d 1078 § 6 (1970) (listing jurisdictions that require actual 
commission). 
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jurisdictions, the victim must have been the one to commit the felony.60 Typ-
ically, the citizen must say that he is arresting and give some notice.61 And in 
many jurisdictions, the felony must be serious.62 That said, constitutional lim-
itations on the use of force by police officers have no purchase on the use of 
force by private citizens; this will be a matter of common law and statutory 
provisions.63 
The bottom line is that when you are arresting, you are never required 
to retreat. Indeed, you can shoot the person in the back as he is running away 
if that is the only way to prevent his escape. To appreciate the full scope of 
this permission, consider Nelson v. Howell,64 a civil action brought by the 
alleged felon to recover damages after he was shot in the back when he tried 
to flee his burglary:65   
 
The appellee is the owner of a seafood store in a shopping center. 
He knew the appellant well and suspected the appellant of being 
the person who had broken into the store on several occasions.  
. . . . 
 The [appellant ran and the] appellee gave chase and grabbed a 
gun as he left the rear of the store. The appellant went out the back 
door with the appellee following him and yelling at him to stop or 
that he would shoot. The appellee fired a warning shot and then, 
realizing that he was not going to be able to catch up with the ap-
pellant on foot, fired his gun and shot the appellant in the back. 
 
 
60. Id. § 7. 
61. Id. § 9. 
62. Id. §10; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 242 A.2d 237, 240 (Pa. 1968) (holding 
that citizen’s arrest with deadly force is “justified only if the felony committed is treason, murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, arson, robbery, common law rape, common law burglary, kid-
napping, assault with intent to murder, rape or rob, or a felony which normally causes or threatens 
death or great bodily harm”). 
63. See, e.g., People v. Couch, 461 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Mich. 1990). The Supreme Court of 
Michigan noted:  
Stated otherwise, it is hard to conceive of an issue more demanding of public 
debate and the give-and-take of the legislative process than whether the citizens 
of Michigan are willing to assume the risk that certain criminals should remain 
at large rather than be subjected to the risk of harm at the hands of their victims. 
The clear question of policy, whether police officers or citizens should be sub-
ject to criminal liability for the killing of a nondangerous fleeing felon, is one 
for the Legislature, not this Court. 
  Id.  
64. 455 So. 2d 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
65. Id. at 608–09. 
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 The trial judge entered a summary judgment for the appellee, rul-
ing that a private citizen has a common law right to arrest a person 
who commits a felony against him and in his presence and thus is 
justified in using whatever force is necessary to effectuate such an 
arrest. We agree with the statement of law, but disagree with the 
trial judge’s tacit ruling that, as a matter of law, force was necessary 
in this case.66 
 
Bottom line: reversible error. This had to go to the jury on the question 
of necessity. But a trial court judge thought this clearly was necessary as a 
matter of law. The authorization of force is extraordinary. 
While these laws have lurked in the background unchanged,67 the kind 
of authorization they provide is becoming far more public. Recent gun inci-
dents tell us that citizens are no longer thinking that they may just defend 
themselves. Instead, they intend to take the fight to the “criminals.” Consider 
the letter by George Barnhill when he determined probable cause did not exist 
in the Ahmaud Arbery case: 
 
It appears Travis McMichael, Greg McMichael, and Bryan Wil-
liam were following, in ‘hot pursuit[,’] a burglary suspect, with 
solid first hand probable cause, in their neighborhood, and asking/ 
telling him to stop. It appears their intent was to stop and hold this 
criminal suspect until law enforcement arrived. Under Georgia 
Law this is perfectly legal . . . .68 
 
And with respect to the plot to kidnap Governor Gretchen Whitmer, 
Sheriff Dar Leaf said, “Are they trying to kidnap? . . . [T]hey want her ar-
rested.  So, are they trying to arrest or was it a kidnap attempt? Because you 
can still in Michigan, . . . you can make a felony arrest.”69 Michigan Attor-
ney General Dana Nessel dismissed the sheriff’s remarks, tweeting, “[L]et 
me make this abundantly clear[—]Persons who are not sworn, licensed 
members of a law enforcement agency cannot and should not ‘arrest’ 
 
66. Id. at 609–10. 
67. See Chad Flanders, Raina Brooks, Jack Compton & Lyz Riley, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Citizen’s Arrest Laws and the Need to Revisit Them, 64 HOW. L.J. 161, 175–76 (2020) (noting that 
the advent of a professional police force should have diminished citizens’ duties and authorization 
to arrest but instead such laws have persisted). 
68. Letter from George E. Barnhill, Dist. Att’y, Waycross Jud. Cir., to Captain Tom Jump, 
Glynn Cnty. Police Dep’t (released Apr. 3, 2020), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6916-
george-barnhill-letter-to-glyn/b52fa09cdc974b970b79/optimized/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY9J-
ZKHY]. 
69. Rachel Sweet, Michigan Attorney and Sheriff Give Perspectives on Kidnapping Plot, WILX 
(Oct. 9, 2020, 9:29 PM), https://www.wilx.com/2020/10/10/michigan-attorney-and-sheriff-give-
perspectives-on-kidnapping-plot/ [https://perma.cc/JH3E-378Q].  
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government [officials] with whom they have disagreements. These com-
ments are dangerous.”70 
Whether such comments are dangerous or not, these laws are on the 
books. The problem is that with a citizenry armed with guns, we have blurred 
every line. What is defense? What is reasonable? When may one stand one’s 
ground and when must one retreat? And, when is a citizen entitled to step in 
as an aggressor in the name of the state? Given the widespread availability of 
police, the number of times citizens need to arrest are minimal and the times 
they ought to pursue with deadly force are infinitesimal. 
Evaluating citizen’s arrest is all the more important when scholars think 
about reining in police departments. If ordinary citizens are going to simply 
fill the void, we may be worse off. Here is a fact about the Zimmerman case 
that often gets lost in the shuffle: Zimmerman was part of a neighborhood 
watch.71 He pursued because he felt entitled to pursue. He pursued because 
Florida law authorized him to do so. As we seek to reform the police, we 




The authors have presented a compelling social problem that needs po-
litical and legal resolution. Unfortunately, in identifying stand your ground 
laws as a pivotal pressure point, they miss just how deeply divided our views 
about guns actually are. If we conceptualize pointing a gun as a mere use of 
nondeadly defensive force, while we simultaneously authorize citizens to use 
force in the name of the state, we are authorizing the widespread wielding of 
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plot [https://perma.cc/27W5-D8BS].  
71. George Zimmerman’s Written Statement, N.Y. TIMES, https://archive.ny-
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